Understanding consumer decisions using behavioral economics by Zandstra, Elizabeth H et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2013
Understanding consumer decisions using behavioral economics
Zandstra, Elizabeth H; Miyapuram, Krishna P; Tobler, Philippe N
Abstract: Consumers make many decisions in everyday life involving finances, food, and health. It is
known from behavioral economics research that people are often driven by short-term gratification, that
is, people tend to choose the immediate, albeit smaller reward. But choosing the delayed reward, that is,
delaying the gratification, can actually be beneficial. How can we motivate consumers to resist the ”now”
and invest in their future, leading to sustainable or healthy habits? We review recent developments from
behavioral and neuroimaging studies that are relevant for understanding consumer decisions. Further,
we present results from our field research that examined whether we can increase the perceived value of a
(delayed) environmental benefit using tailored communication, that is, change the way it is framed. More
specifically, we investigated whether we can boost the value of an abstract, long-term ”green” claim of a
product by expressing it as a concrete, short-term benefit. This is a new application area for behavioral
economics.
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62604-2.00012-5
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-73002
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Zandstra, Elizabeth H; Miyapuram, Krishna P; Tobler, Philippe N (2013). Understanding consumer
decisions using behavioral economics. In: Chandrasekhar Pammi, V S; Narayanan, Srinivasan. Decision
Making - Neural and Behavioural Approaches. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 197-211. DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-
444-62604-2.00012-5
-­‐1-	  
	  
Understanding Consumer Decisions Using Behavioural Economics 1	  
Elizabeth H. Zandstra1*, Krishna P. Miyapuram1,2, Philippe N. Tobler3  2	  
1 Sensation, Perception & Behaviour, Unilever R&D Vlaardingen, P.O. Box 114, 3130 AC 3	  
Vlaardingen, The Netherlands. E-mail:  liesbeth.zandstra@unilever.com. 4	  
2 Center for Mind/Brain Sciences (CIMeC), Università degli Studi di Trento, Via delle Regole 101, 5	  
38060 Mattarello (TN), Italy. E-mail: krishna.miyapuram@cantab.net. 6	  
3 Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Department of Economics, University of 7	  
Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail: phil.tobler@econ.uzh.ch. 8	  
 9	  
* Corresponding Author 10	  
 11	  
Abstract: Consumers make many decisions in everyday life involving finances, food and health. It 12	  
is known from behavioural economics research that people are often driven by short-term 13	  
gratification, i.e. people tend to choose the immediate, albeit smaller reward. But choosing the 14	  
delayed reward, i.e. delaying the gratification, can actually be beneficial. How can we motivate 15	  
consumers to resist the ‘now’ and invest in their future, leading to sustainable or healthy habits? 16	  
We review recent developments from behavioural and neuroimaging studies that are relevant for 17	  
understanding consumer decisions. Further, we present results from our field research that 18	  
examined whether we can increase the perceived value of a (delayed) environmental benefit using 19	  
tailored communication, i.e. change the way it is framed. More specifically, we investigated 20	  
whether we can boost the value of an abstract, long-term ‘green’ claim of a product by expressing 21	  
it as a concrete, short-term benefit. This is a new application area for behavioural economics.  22	  
Key words: Neuroeconomics; decision making; consumer preference; environmental benefits; 23	  
health benefits; immediate rewards; delayed rewards; intertemporal choice.  24	  
 25	  
Introduction 26	  
Many decisions in day-to-day life involve considering alternatives that will occur at some point in 27	  
the future. Consider for example, when given a choice between choosing $5 now or $10 in two 28	  
weeks time, people tend to choose the immediate, albeit smaller reward. Recent developments in 29	  
behavioural economics and neuroeconomics research has increased our understanding of how 30	  
people make decisions in various contexts. Behavioural economics is a research field that uses 31	  
psychological science to understand how people make economic decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 32	  
1979; Camerer, 1999). This field recently expanded into neuroeconomics that looks at the role of 33	  
the brain when people evaluate decisions, categorize risks and rewards, and how these interact 34	  
with each other (Loewenstein et al., 2008). Of particular interest is the time-discounted utility theory 35	  
in this – so far mainly used in economics. Time-discounting describes the subjective devaluation of 36	  
outcomes as a function of the time delay until their delivery, such that immediate rewards are more 37	  
highly valued and hold a greater control over behaviour than those which are delayed (Frederick et 38	  
al., 2002). This chapter will discuss recent developments in our understanding of factors that 39	  
influence consumers’ decisions, with a particular focus on discounting behaviour around immediate 40	  
and delayed rewards of fast moving consumer goods (FMCG). This is followed by some data on 41	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boosting the value of delayed rewards in order to make them more motivating for consumers. 42	  
Finally, we discuss the implications of such research and identify new avenues for research. 43	  
Psychological theories have emphasised the importance of rewards in decision making. Rewards 44	  
have been defined operationally as stimuli which positively reinforce behaviour, and increase the 45	  
frequency and intensity with which behaviours are elicited (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; McClure et 46	  
al., 2004b). Rewards may be either primary or secondary in nature. Primary rewards such as food, 47	  
water or sexual stimuli, have the ability to reinforce behaviour without the need to be learnt, 48	  
whereas secondary rewards, such as money, receive their reward value by being associated with 49	  
primary rewards through conditioning (Rolls, 2007). In decision making situations involving choice 50	  
behaviour, individuals choose the option that yields the highest expected reward value. The 51	  
equivalent concept from behavioural economics is that of the utility function, which combines 52	  
several parameters of each option into one single unitary value. In this way, decisions among 53	  
several alternatives are driven by the aim of maximising utility. The key assumption here is that the 54	  
utility function provides a way of quantifying the subjective reward value that an individual attaches 55	  
to each option. We propose that the concept of utility functions can be applied to better understand 56	  
consumer decision making in a principled way.  57	  
In recent years, a lot of interest has arisen towards neuroeconomics to determine where aspects of 58	  
decision making occur in the brain and to investigate how the brain computes reward value. Also, 59	  
building on the utility framework, more and more studies addressed the question whether there 60	  
exists a region of the brain that commonly encodes decision values for different types of rewards, 61	  
or if, in contrast, the values of different types of rewards are represented in distinct brain regions 62	  
(Chib et al., 2009). The results of these studies have systematically revealed that the utility is 63	  
represented in the so-called reward centers of the brain (Knutson et al., 2005). Neurophysiological 64	  
studies in animals have provided the primary basis for identifying the core neuronal circuitry 65	  
underlying rewards. This core reward circuitry is composed of the ventral striatum and orbitofrontal 66	  
cortex, both receiving inputs from the dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra and ventral 67	  
tegmental areas in the midbrain (see Schultz (2000) for review). Neuroimaging studies in humans 68	  
show similar findings and have revealed activation in analogous brain regions to various rewarding 69	  
stimuli and predictors of reward (see O’Doherty (2004) for review). Chib et al. (2009) asked 70	  
participants in the fMRI scanner to make purchasing decisions among different types of rewards 71	  
(i.e. food, nonfood consumables and monetary gambles) and they found activity in the 72	  
ventromedial frontal cortex to be correlated with subjects’ valuations for all types of rewards. These 73	  
results have been confirmed by Kim et al. (2011) who found that secondary rewards such as 74	  
money activated the same reward regions as primary rewards such as juice (Kim et al., 2011). 75	  
Furthermore, pictures of appetizing foods activate the same reward regions of the brain as the 76	  
actual experiences that occur while actually consuming these foods (Simmons et al., 2005). These 77	  
neural findings have significantly contributed to our understanding that a common reward valuation 78	  
system is responsible for processing different types of reward.  79	  
Neuroeconomic methods have also shown that the neural mechanisms underlying consumer 80	  
decisions could reliably predict consumer choices (see Kenning & Plassmann (2008) for a review; 81	  
Tusche et al., 2010). For example, Knutson et al. (2007) showed that nucleus accumbens activity 82	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predicted an upcoming purchase decision when viewing a product, even before price information 83	  
was known. In addition, Levy et al. (2011) showed that the activation in the striatum and medial 84	  
prefrontal cortex during passive viewing of products reliably predicted subsequent choices made 85	  
outside the scanner. In a similar vein, Plassmann et al. (2007) found that the medial orbitofrontal 86	  
cortex encoded ‘willingness to pay’ for 50 different sweet and salty snack foods (e.g. chips and 87	  
candy bars) by hungry subjects. Until now, as far as we are aware, most research has focused on 88	  
preference for immediate rewards, and have not addressed how we can boost the utility of delayed 89	  
rewards. However, several choices also involve making decisions regarding potential future 90	  
rewards, a topic of high relevance to understand consumer decision behaviour.  91	  
Intertemporal Choice & Delayed Gratification 92	  
Why is it difficult to save for a pension or maintain a healthy diet? Intertemporal choices are 93	  
decisions about future and delayed consequences and occur in most of our decisions in daily life, 94	  
such as adopting and maintaining a healthy lifestyle, investing in a health insurance or saving for a 95	  
pension (Berns et al., 2007). This temporal aspect in decision making involves trade-offs between 96	  
immediate consumption and considerations about better future payoffs. Such intertemporal choices 97	  
present a challenge for a decision maker, as there is a tendency to favour immediate gratification 98	  
over benefits which are delayed in the future: instant gratification often appears to be far too much 99	  
a temptation (Blackburn, 2012; Blackburn et al., 2012). The discounted utility model (Samuelson, 100	  
1937) posits that decisions are made as a weighted sum of utilities with temporal discount factors 101	  
as weights. This model assumes a constant discount rate, which ensures that a preference 102	  
between two delayed options is only dependent on the time delay between them. The order of 103	  
preferences should be preserved at all possible time points (time consistency or stationarity). This 104	  
behaviour is implemented by an exponential form of discounting into the equation.   105	   𝑉 = 𝐴𝑒!!", where V is the discounted value, A is the absolute value, k is a constant discounting 106	  
parameter and d is the delay.  (Equation 1) 107	  
Consider the example when given a choice between choosing $5 now or $10 in two weeks. The 108	  
smaller sooner reward ($5 now) may be preferred compared to the larger delayed reward ($10 in 2 109	  
weeks) because the value of the future reward is discounted below the value of the immediate 110	  
reward (Equation 1; Figure 1). Now, consider that both options in the above gamble are further 111	  
delayed by one week. The exponential model of discounting suggests that the smaller sooner 112	  
reward ($5 in one week) would still be preferred over the larger later reward ($10 in 3 weeks). 113	  
However, behavioural experiments showed that people fail to conform to such a prediction (Berns 114	  
et al., 2007). Thus, a preference reversal occurs if people prefer the larger delayed reward in one 115	  
but not the other situation. This behaviour is captured by the hyperbolic discounting model 116	  
(Equation 2; Figure 1). The latter finding is particularly relevant for consumer behaviour, i.e. how to 117	  
motivate consumers to resist the now and invest in future rewards.  118	   𝑉 = !!!!", where the different symbols hold the same meaning as Equation 1. (Equation 2) 119	  
 120	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-- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE-- 121	  
 122	  
Neuroeconomic findings argue that immediate and future rewards are represented by either a 123	  
unitary system, in which discounting arises as a function of a single valuation mechanism, or a dual 124	  
system, which focuses on the interaction between two separate decision processes that have 125	  
competing goals. Neuroeconomic research tried to address both discounting mechanisms in 126	  
decision making. For example, Kable and Glimcher (2007) showed that neural activity in ventral 127	  
striatum, medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex tracked the subjective value of 128	  
delayed monetary rewards when participants choose between a fixed immediate reward of $20 129	  
and a larger delayed reward, a value in the range from $20.25 to $110, available after a delay 130	  
ranging from 6 hours to 180 days. With the help of a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, McClure et 131	  
al. (2004a) found separate neural systems underlying immediate and delayed rewards. They 132	  
examined neural correlates of time discounting while subjects made a series of choices between 133	  
monetary reward options that varied by delay (same day to 6 weeks later) to delivery. They found 134	  
that ventral striatum, medial OFC, medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), posterior cingulate and left 135	  
posterior hippocampus were related to choices of immediate rewards. In contrast, regions of lateral 136	  
prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex were engaged uniformly by intertemporal choices 137	  
irrespective of delay. In a subsequent study, McClure et al. (2007) used primary rewards (fruit juice 138	  
or water) with time delays of minutes instead of weeks and found similar activation patterns as in 139	  
their previous study. The studies of Kable & Glimcher (2007) and McClure et al. (2004a; 2007) 140	  
provided evidence for unitary and dual system accounts of processing immediate and delayed 141	  
rewards, respectively.  142	  
Prior research has mainly considered temporal discounting of monetary rewards in humans and 143	  
primary rewards such as food in animals. Given that the neural substrates of different goods 144	  
overlap, it is critical to consider whether temporal discounting behavior is domain specific or not. 145	  
Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010) examined intertemporal choice for money (dollars) and three 146	  
food-related consumables (candy bars, chips and beer) at five different delays – one week, one 147	  
month, six months, one year, and three years. A domain-general discounting was revealed by 148	  
positive correlation for discounting rates for the four categories. However, steeper discounting was 149	  
found for items that individuals found more tempting. In another study comparing financial, 150	  
environmental and health gains or losses available immediately or after a delay of 1 or 10 years, 151	  
Hardisty and Weber (2009) found that discount rates are influenced more by the valence of 152	  
outcomes (gains or losses) than by domain (i.e. money, environment or health). More importantly, 153	  
at short or medium delays, they found that environmental outcomes were discounted in a similar 154	  
way as financial outcomes. This recent behavioural work opens a new area of application for 155	  
behavioural economics to outcomes involving health and environmental benefits.  156	  
An active area of research parallel to intertemporal choice paradigms is that of delayed gratification 157	  
– the ability to wait over a delayed time interval to receive the desired reward. In the classic 158	  
marshmallow test by Mischel et al. (1989), pre-school children were encouraged to resist the 159	  
temptation of eating a single piece of their favourite confectionary while the experimenter was 160	  
absent from the room up to 15 minutes. In exchange, children who could successfully delay the 161	  
gratification would be offered two pieces of their preferred confectionary. The observation of 162	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childrens’ behavior revealed different cognitive strategies - by focusing on the ‘hot’ properties such 163	  
as the taste of the confectionary led the child to be more impulsive, while focusing on the ‘cool’ 164	  
properties such as the shape of the object or other types of distractions, children were able to wait 165	  
for longer. A remarkable finding is that the delay gratification measures of these pre-schoolers 166	  
could successfully predict their scholastic achievements as adolescents (Mischel et al., 1989). A 167	  
recent brain imaging study examined cognitive control strategies on a subset of the original study’s 168	  
participants using a go/no-go paradigm (Casey et al., 2011). Activation in the inferior frontal gyrus 169	  
was greater for high delayers, whereas activation in ventral striatum was greater for low delayers. 170	  
The findings from these longitudinal studies (spread over four decades) expand our knowledge on 171	  
individual differences in self-control and the appropriate strategies for cognitive control.  172	  
Cognitive Modulation of Immediate Rewards 173	  
Reward processing has received a lot of attention in psychology and in the neurosciences, and our 174	  
understanding of neurological systems underlying reward processing has increased tremendously 175	  
in the last decade. To date, most of this research has focused on bottom-up processing, i.e. 176	  
involving stimuli that are innately seen as rewards/punishments. Less attention has, however, been 177	  
paid to top-down processing, i.e. the influence of expectations – based on prior knowledge, our 178	  
own thoughts and ideas, information, emotions – on the processing of rewards. 179	  
Expectations are an important tool for humans, helping us to predict daily life and to deal with 180	  
uncertainties. These expectations have an influence on how we perceive and even on what we 181	  
perceive. For consumers, expectations of product performance through price or brand 182	  
communication such as advertising and packaging play a significant role in deciding whether to 183	  
buy a product or not. There are a number of behavioural food studies that showed that 184	  
expectations influence the perception and reward value of a food (Cardello, 2007; Deliza & 185	  
MacFie, 1996;	  Winkielman et al., 2005). For example, the expectation of a red wine will change the 186	  
taste description of a coloured white wine (Morret et al., 2001), and believing in the effect of an 187	  
ingredient can lead to a strong placebo effect (Kuenzel et al., 2011). 188	  
More and more neuroimaging studies have been conducted that support that expectations 189	  
influence the reward value of a stimulus (de Araujo et al., 2005; McClure et al., 2004b; Plassman et 190	  
al., 2008). A key experiment was carried out by de Araujo et al. (2005) using the odour isovaleric 191	  
acid. They presented participants this odour in combination with different cognitive labels. When 192	  
the odour was labelled with ‘cheese’, subjects expressed liking the odour more than when it was 193	  
labelled with ‘body odour’. Moreover, different areas in the brain were activated depending on the 194	  
cognitive labels presented. Another study focussed on the effect of brand preference on reward 195	  
processing of a primary reward like a sugared drink (McClure et al., 2004b). McClure et al. (2004b) 196	  
presented participants two drinks, Pepsi and Coke, which are essentially sweet brown liquids with 197	  
similar taste and sugar content. They gave participants the drinks unbranded and showed that the 198	  
sugar in it leads to an activation of reward processes in the brain, more specifically in the 199	  
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Interestingly, they then gave participants the drinks branded and 200	  
showed that -for subjects who preferred Coke over Pepsi- more reward-related brain areas were 201	  
activated when the Coke brand was shown, compared to when the Pepsi brand was shown. These 202	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brain areas (the hippocampus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) have been associated with 203	  
emotion and affect. This shows that the reward can be generalised to a brand. In a similar vein, 204	  
Plassmann et al. (2008) showed that other marketing actions, such as changes in price of a 205	  
product, can affect neural representations of experienced pleasantness. They asked subjects to 206	  
taste (identical) wines that they believed to be different and sold at different prices. They 207	  
hypothesised that a higher price would result in higher taste expectations and hence would lead to 208	  
higher activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), an area in the brain that is widely thought 209	  
to encode for experienced pleasantness. The results were consistent with this hypothesis: the 210	  
reported price of wines markedly affected self-reported experienced pleasantness and, more 211	  
importantly, also modulated the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the mOFC. These 212	  
results show that a reward value of a food not only depends on the sensory properties of the food 213	  
and/or the current state of the consumer: the brain computes a reward value in a much more 214	  
sophisticated manner that involves integrating the sensory properties of the food being consumed 215	  
with the expectations about how good it should be. 216	  
Little is known about how top-down effects influences choice behaviour. In a laboratory behavioural 217	  
experiment using a within-subjects design, Zandstra & El-Deredy (2011) gave 44 subjects one of 218	  
two yoghurt drinks, alternating between high-energy and low-energy yoghurt drinks (255 kcal and 219	  
57 kcal per 200ml serving, respectively), first thing in the morning following 8 hours of fasting, 220	  
every day for two weeks, with 5 exposures to each yoghurt drink on alternate days. Both drinks 221	  
were similar in appearance, texture, taste etc. Participants were not aware that the drinks differed 222	  
in any way, except that one drink was paired with a blue label, and the other with a pink label, with 223	  
the pairings fully counter-balanced. Every day of the third (test) week, participants were given the 224	  
choice of either having the pink or the blue labeled yoghurt drink. Participants did not differentiate 225	  
between the yoghurt drinks in terms of how much they said they liked them. However, clear and 226	  
pronounced effects were found for the behaviour measure preference: even though the yoghurt 227	  
drinks were equally liked, participants chose the high energy drink significantly more often over the 228	  
low energy drink. This suggests a conditioned preference for a delayed physiological (energy) 229	  
reward. Further evaluative conditioning research with food stimuli under realistic choice conditions 230	  
in a natural (everyday life) context is needed to confirm this conclusion. We are now beginning to 231	  
study the neural correlates of this behaviour with a view to being able to better understand and 232	  
perhaps predict subjects’ choices. Are different reward areas of the brain being activated by the 233	  
two drinks? Is there any mismatch between what we expect and what we observe? 234	  
To recapitulate, just as in behavioural studies, neuroimaging studies do support the influence of a 235	  
number of different top-down effects on the reward value of stimuli. These top-down influences are 236	  
strong enough to override bottom-up effects such as sensory stimulation and they potentially drive 237	  
choice behaviour. Therefore, it is critical to take all these different aspects of a product into account 238	  
to create a maximised immediate rewarding experience. 239	  
Boosting Delayed Rewards  240	  
An immediate rewarding experience is delivered directly at the point of consumption (e.g. price, 241	  
efficacy), whereas delayed rewards are characterized by a delay, i.e. it takes months or even years 242	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until effects can be measured (e.g. health or sustainability).	   Even though delayed rewards are 243	  
motivating for consumers in the long-term, it takes time before they are actually perceived by 244	  
consumers. Decision making in relation to health and sustainability is therefore not readily 245	  
predictable as these rewards are less tangible, more impersonal and delayed. Consumers will ask 246	  
themselves: 1) ‘’will I receive a reward?’’, 2) ‘’when will I receive a reward?’’, and 3)  ‘’what reward 247	  
will I receive?’’. As mentioned before, behavioural economics research shows that consumers are 248	  
often driven by short-term gratification: people tend to choose the sooner, smaller reward. It is 249	  
therefore critical to address this for behaviours around health and sustainability. The challenge 250	  
here will be to turn delayed and impersonal rewards into personally (immediately) perceivable 251	  
rewards. This, in the end, will maximise the delayed rewarding experience.  252	  
So far, the paradigms that tested for choices between immediate and delayed rewards have mainly 253	  
been concerned with impulsive choices (e.g. McClure et al., 2004a). Little is known about how to 254	  
best promote choices of products with delayed rewards. When it comes to higher order choice 255	  
motivations such as health and sustainability, there is a considerable attitude-behaviour gap 256	  
(Sheeran, 2002), i.e. consumers “talk healthy” or “talk green” but “don’t walk it”. For example, 257	  
Weijzen et al. (2008) found a substantial inconsistency between healthful stated snack choice 258	  
intentions and actual behaviour. Participants were asked about their intentions in choosing among 259	  
four snacks: an apple, a banana, a candy bar and a waffle. About half of the participants indicated 260	  
they would choose the apple or banana - a "healthy" snack. But when presented with the actual 261	  
snacks one week later, 27% switched to the candy bar or waffle. Over 90% of the unhealthy-choice 262	  
participants stuck with their intentions and chose the unhealthy snack. This demonstrates that 263	  
intentions are usually under cognitive control while actual choices are often made impulsively, even 264	  
unconsciously. 265	  
Behavioural economics might enable us to explore the dynamics of these decisions in more detail. 266	  
The behavioural economics approach has been investigated extensively in the financial domain. 267	  
Recent developments show that this approach can be extended to other domains such as food 268	  
(Epstein et al., 2010). Consider the following scenario: given a choice between a tasty, but 269	  
potentially unhealthy food (e.g. a burger) available immediately and a second option which involves 270	  
resisting the temptation now and choosing to have a healthy weight in future, usually people would 271	  
want both. However, the consequences and antecedents for these two choices are very different. 272	  
Choosing a high fat food is ultimately detrimental to your body weight and the choice of maintaining 273	  
a healthy weight requires eating low fat foods such as vegetables. In order to promote the healthy 274	  
option, we could potentially think of two policies – either make people pay more for the burger or 275	  
make vegetables a much cheaper food. Classical economics theory suggests that if the price of a 276	  
particular food decreases, choice for that food will increase, and vice versa. However, recent 277	  
research by Epstein et al. (2010) showed that providing subsidy on healthier foods is not a good 278	  
strategy, as the consumers will use the money saved to invest back into the unhealthy option.  279	  
In our current research, we explored whether the behavioural economics approach can be 280	  
extrapolated to sustainability as well. As indicated before, environmental benefits are extremely 281	  
delayed in time, which makes them less tangible compared to immediate benefits, such as price 282	  
and efficacy. A consumer is unlikely to directly experience many environmental benefits in his/her 283	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life time. A green claim, therefore, is not a directly perceivable reward and appeals to consumers 284	  
only through their individual belief in environmental benefits (Bolderdijk, 2011). Moreover, in our 285	  
research we draw on construal level theory and build on the assumption that environmental 286	  
benefits are not the primary, but are rather secondary drivers of product choice because of their 287	  
perceived psychological distance to the ‘now’, i.e. a primary benefit ‘what the product does for you’ 288	  
vs. a secondary benefit  ’with what social and ecological impact the product does it’ (Trope et al., 289	  
2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010). Both primary and secondary benefits may be salient and relevant 290	  
to the consumer,  but in terms of determinance in guiding behaviour primary benefits typically take 291	  
priority. Especially when primary and secondary benefits are to some extent at odds, social 292	  
dilemma theory indeed indicates that it is more likely that primary benefits will be persued to direct 293	  
need satisfaction than that people sacrifice their immediate self-interest for long-term collective 294	  
benefit (Balliet et al., 2011; Van Lange et al., 1998).  295	  
Therefore, the question we asked ourselves is whether we can boost the utility curve of a delayed 296	  
reward in a product by re-framing it as a primary benefit. For example, one could frame a green 297	  
claim by only emphasising the green benefit (e.g. ‘With this soup we help to protect the planet’s 298	  
natural resources, as it is made with eco-friendly tomatoes.’), or one could frame a green claim by 299	  
expressing it as a primary benefit (e.g. ‘This soup is a great tasting soup, as it is made with eco-300	  
friendly tomatoes, which also helps to protect the planet’s natural resources.’). 301	  
Previous research showed that re-framing delayed outcomes can impact the ability to consider 302	  
future consequences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). One approach is to raise awareness about 303	  
environmental issues and the individual consumer role and responsibility by educating the 304	  
consumer using explicit and tailored information, spelling out what the consumer needs to do. For 305	  
example, in hotel rooms guests are generally pointed at the threat posed to the environment from 306	  
the daily cleaning of towels. They are kindly asked to re-use their towels in order to protect the 307	  
environment by not dropping them on the floor. Goldstein et al. (2008) demonstrated that when 308	  
guests were made aware of the fact that “the majority of guests in this room have re-used their 309	  
towels”, they were more likely to re-use their towels as well. Interestingly, just by re-framing it and 310	  
making it more personally relevant, consumers showed more sustainable behaviour.  311	  
Experiment into boosting delayed rewards 312	  
In a laboratory experiment, we examined whether we can increase the perceived value of a 313	  
(delayed) environmental benefit using tailored communication, i.e. by changing the way it is 314	  
framed. More specifically, we investigated whether we can boost the value of an abstract, long-315	  
term green claim in a home care product by expressing it as a concrete, short-term benefit. The 316	  
key question was: Which combinations of primary and green benefits works the best in boosting 317	  
the utility of the delayed reward?  318	  
Participants - A total of 254 consumers were recruited within the UK for an in-home or at work 319	  
internet-based study. Among these were 117 males and 137 females with an average age of 39 ± 320	  
9.6 years. The sample was representative of the wider population in terms of socioeconomic 321	  
status, educational level and income level. Participants received a small incentive for participation 322	  
in the study. 323	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Stimuli - We tested six primary benefits with four green claims. The green claims varied on three 324	  
parameters: type of green claim, quantity of green claim and time to achieve the green claim. From 325	  
available data from an environmental calculator at internet, average savings per months were 326	  
calculated for each claim type (e.g. saving 500 trees in 1 month). Four time points (3 months, 6 327	  
months, 1 year and 2 years) were chosen to enable us to construct the utility curves. To match with 328	  
the four time points, the average monthly environmental savings were multiplied by the duration 329	  
(i.e. 3, 6, 12, or 24 months) to give four different quantities. For a given green claim type, the 330	  
quantity and time were varied independently, with the contraint that any given choice set with a 331	  
repeated type of green claim should satisfy the following condition: longer time to achieve the 332	  
green claim should always be accompanied by increased quantity of environmental savings. A 333	  
linear relationship between time and quantity was not enforced to ensure that these two 334	  
parameters were orthogonal. The research reported here focusses on the results of only one of the 335	  
four green claims as similar results were observed for the other green claims. 336	  
Procedure - Using a conjoint, 3-alternative forced choice approach, we asked consumers to 337	  
choose one among three pairs of statements: “Which statement would motivate you the most to 338	  
buy home care product ‘X’?”. Each pair of statements consisted of a primary and a green claim. 339	  
Participants indicated their choice by selecting a radio button at the bottom of the screen. In total, 340	  
participants completed 8 such choice tasks.  341	  
Data analysis - Hierarchical Bayesian models were fitted to the observed choice data. The choice 342	  
of models was based on their root likelihood ratio (RLH). The maximum RLH was set to 1000. If 343	  
respondents chose completely randomly among the three alternatives that were presented, the 344	  
root likelihood ratio (RLH) would be 1000/3=333. Three Hierarchical Bayesian models were fitted 345	  
to the choice data: model I included only the main effects (RLH 535), model II included main 346	  
effects and significant interaction effect of (green claim)x(quantity of green claim) (RLH 557), and 347	  
model III included main effects with relevant interaction effects, i.e. (primary claim)x(green claim), 348	  
(type of green claim)x(quantity of green claim), (type of green claim)x(time to achieve green claim), 349	  
(quantity of green claim)x(time to achieve green claim) (RLH 659). Model III with the highest RLH 350	  
was used for reporting the results. The advantage of using a hierarchical bayesian model over 351	  
traditional models such as logit was that we could estimate the utilities for each participant for all 352	  
the choices, even though they would have actually responded to only a subset of the choice set.  353	  
-- INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE-- 354	  
Results - Figure 2 shows the perceived value of one of the green claims using tailored 355	  
communication. Inspection of Figure 2 shows that the perceived value (estimated utilities) 356	  
decreased over time corresponding to standard utility curves in behavioural economics. Also, we 357	  
observed a shift in the utility by expressing the green claim as a primary benefit. Statistical analysis 358	  
confirmed these clear differences in utility curves (p<0.05), even though the discounting factor (k) 359	  
was small. Further, we do not notice a change in the slope of the utility curves [no significant 360	  
interaction effect (p>0.05) of (green claim)x(primary benefit)].                                361	  
Conclusion - We confirmed our hypothesis that by appropriately communicating the green claim as 362	  
a primary benefit, we can boost the perceived value of it. Therefore, to motivate consumers to buy 363	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a product with an environmental benefit, it needs to have a green claim expressed as a concrete 364	  
and short-term benefit.  365	  
Conclusions and Future Directions 366	  
Sustainability is a new application area for behavioural economics. This approach for the study of 367	  
delayed rewards can be extended to other domains such as reducing obesity (Just & Payne, 2009) 368	  
and improving cardiovascular health (Fair et al., 2008). The research in this area will probably be 369	  
most successful if it takes a holistic approach into account, i.e. focusing on product, packaging and 370	  
communication as well as on the consumer and the context in which a product is consumed and 371	  
used. 372	  
Future research should focus on the neural integration of primary and environmental benefits. So 373	  
far, it is unclear whether environmental benefits are processed in the same way as primary benefits 374	  
and whether the two are actually incorporated into a single utility processing module in the brain. If 375	  
this were the case, then trade-offs between immediate primary and delayed environmental benefits 376	  
would indeed be real and one would be more confident that one can substitute for the other. In a 377	  
similar vein, it would be of interest to investigate whether environmental benefits are encoded in 378	  
the activations of brain regions that process also primary benefits and how these or other brain 379	  
activations predict actual choice behaviour. For the latter, it is critical to design studies to better link 380	  
brain responses to real decisions, and there is a clear need for long-term studies of repeated 381	  
choice and consumption. 382	  
Over the past decade we have learned that there are tremendous individual differences in brain 383	  
responses. We therefore expect that there will be individual differences in the degree to which 384	  
primary and environmental benefits are weighted. A brain region integrating the two types of 385	  
benefits would show stronger activation to higher levels of primary benefits and further 386	  
enhancement of signals by larger environmental benefits if participants value these benefits 387	  
positively or suppression of signal if they value them negatively. Moreover, activation should be 388	  
equal if the sum of environmental and primary benefits is equal, such that an increase in one can 389	  
substitute for a decrease in the other. We predict such brain regions to include the striatum and 390	  
parts of the prefrontal cortex.  391	  
To conclude, in this chapter we have explored the behavioural economics approach with a focus 392	  
on delayed rewards. Behavioural economics studies have provided a principled approach to 393	  
understand consumer decisions. Neuroeconomics research gives us three unique insights in 394	  
understanding consumer decisions: 1) the core reward circuitry in the brain is activated by different 395	  
kinds of rewards, 2) temporal aspects of decisions, i.e. immediate and delayed rewards, are 396	  
represented in the brain, and 3) expectations influence the perceived value of rewards. Together, 397	  
behavioural and neuroimaging findings have suggested that ‘framing’ could be a way forward to 398	  
boost the value of delayed rewards. We confirmed our hypothesis that by appropriately 399	  
communicating a green claim, we can boost the perceived value of it. Therefore, to motivate 400	  
consumers to buy a product with an environmental benefit, it needs to have a green claim 401	  
expressed as a concrete and short-term benefit. This is a new application area for behavioural 402	  
economics, which has so far been mainly implemented for monetary rewards. There is much more 403	  
potential for consumer relevant research, for example in rational decision making and prediction of 404	  
actual choice behaviour.  405	  
 406	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FIGURES 
Understanding Consumer Decisions Using Behavioural Economics 
EH Zandstra et al. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of discounted utility functions defined by exponential and hyperbolic function. 
Discounted values are calculated as per Eq.s 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
Figure 2. Boosting the perceived value of a delayed reward using tailored communication. The y-
axis shows perceived values (estimated utilities), for one of the four green claims (dotted line) and 
the corresponding one of six primary benefits, which was found to be an optimal combination. The 
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solid line is obtained by summing the utilities of the green claim, the primary benefit and interaction 
term. Each of the main estimated utility terms are zero-centred by definition. Hence, the sum of 
them need not always be higher than the individual terms. The relative value can be compared 
between any pair of points.  
